Thought this was another vulnerability for a second, but for anyone else who thought the same, this is already covered in the Ruby advisory being discussed here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50554038 (which covers six other vulnerabilities).
There should be other codepoints other than ß that in principle could be used for a vulnerability like that. There are even ones that expand to three codepoints, like ffi.
I suppose this function has been written first in assumption, that case conversion doesn't affect length, but later ß -> SS conversion has been added without proper testing.
There was never any guarantee that case conversion is byte length equivalent. Except for pure ASCII, that's just been an incorrect assumption from the start.
Ah, so that's the real reason "ß" is now allowed in uppercase too (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%9F)? Reducing the risk of security issues by removing an edge case?
You can freely specify the encoding when sending multipart/form-data POST since Rails respects the charset attribute in Content-Type, eg Content-Type: text/plain; charset=Windows-1252
would you rather we publish a PoC for a vulnerability that doesn't even have a patch yet? e.g self-hosted GitLab still hasn't shipped a newer version of Ruby that's patched...
The days of people feeling secure because they don't make egregious mistakes are unfortunately over. Now the rule is: You are vulnerable, you just don't know how.
would be wildly irresponsible
Well…